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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHAHD NOLAN JARDINE, I\ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. , Case No. 
BRUNS\VICK CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant, ~ 10631 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent begs the Court's indulgence in restat-
ing the nature of the case, differing from Appellant's 
statement. 
S'l'ATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought action for damages suffered by 
him in reliance on the defendant's negligent and reck-
less represenations concerning a builder with whom 
plaintiff contracted for the construction of bowling 
lanes. 
1 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Although Appellant correctly states the rule that 
upon defendant's motion to dismiss the Court must 
view the facts most favorable to the plaintiff (Hespon-
dent) the Appellant then proceeds to state the facts 
with an interpretation favorable to the defendant and 
unfavorable to the plaintiff. Hcspondent therefore re-
states the facts more fully than did the Appellant. 
The plaintiff, Richard Nolan .T ardine, was born 
at Taylorsville, Idaho, aud was 54 years old at the time 
of the trial. He had an eighth grade education, worked 
first in a spud warehouse in Idaho Falls, Idaho, which 
was seasonal. He got married, moved to Butte, l\Ion-
tana, and "started to hauling mining props into the 
mine there" which he did for fhe or six years (H. 120). 
He had lived in Salt Lake for five years, having come 
here in 1959 from l\1oses Lake, 'V ashington ( R. 119) . 
In Butte, Montana, he had his own truck, one helper 
and worked on a contract basis. He went from llutte 
to Mossy Rock, 'Vashington where he set up a sawmill 
and manufactured railroad ties and two-by-fours for 
Timber Developing Company. At one time he had 30 
employees (R. 121). He then went to Renton, lVash-
ington, where he erected a store building, a barber shop 
and a caf e employing sub-contractors and also set up 
his sawmill on the lake, purchasing logs from .Tippo 
Loggers (R. 122). The buildings cost $18,000.00, 
$2,000.00 and $7,000.00 (R. 183). He left Renton for 
Moses Lake, having lost his health at Renton and al 
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l\Ioses Lake "I accumulated a place there that turned 
into quite a lot of money" which he sold five or six years 
before the trial. Upon leaving, he leased his sawmill with 
an option to buy and had to take it back (R. 122). 
He had developed asthma in Washington and had 
to spend several weeks in the hospital, from which asthma 
he never recovered. Ile has been on cortisone for 14 
years which has slowed down his mind and intellect and 
it "takes me a little longer to think things out" and 
he is unable to do physical work ( R. 123) . 
Two of his boys were in Salt Lake City going to 
school and in 1959 he and his other two boys came here 
so that they could be together (R. 124). Since being in 
Salt Lake he has hauled trailers for National Trailer 
Convoy for a year and a half at which he made no 
money. 
In August, 1961, he looked at some possible bowl-
ing sites with Ida Young and in November, 1961, she 
called Harold Tracy of the Brunswick Company and 
set up a meeting ( R. 126). He went alone to see Tracy 
who was second in line to Mr. Dobbs at Brunswick 
Company and told Tracy it was necessary to have some-
one erect the building for a bowling lane and Tracy 
said this 'vas no problem (R. 127). Tracy and Carl 
Dinius and plaintiff looked at a two-acre site in Magna, 
which Brunswick had under option (R. 128). They 
talked about 16 or 24 lanes at a price of $15,000.00 
each for equipment only, not including the building and 
land ( R. 129). They said several building contractors 
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were available. Plaintiff journeyed to Washington to 
inquire about financing and to inquire into the bowliug 
business. He returned in early January, 1962, and told 
Harold Tracy he could raise $32,000.00 which would 
be 10 % down on 24 lanes ( R. 130) . They said it was 
necessary for him to go to managing school and a 
Doctor King would finance the building "and when I 
got back they would have the set up for the building of 
the building." He went to Chicago to school for two 
weeks in February, 1962, and when he returned, he con-
tacted Doctor King who had decided not to go any 
further with the building (R. 131). 
A week or ten days later, Tracy called and said he 
had a builder named Jack Charlesworth. He went to 
Brunswick's office and there was a meeting in the back 
part attended by Tracy, Dinius, Dobbs - part of the 
time-his son Dee and Charlesworth came in late (R. 
132). 
In introducing Charlesworth, Tracy used the lan-
guage quoted by Appellant at Page 7 of its Brief. They 
discussed a 23,000 square foot building which would cost 
$240,000.00 and which Charlesworth said he would rent 
at 1 % per month. Tracy said that wasn't high as all 
their bowling alleys were paying about the same rent 
(R. 133). He had previously told Tracy he wanted to 
rent the building with option to buy. Charlesworth 
wanted 60 days to decide and wanted a writing to giYe 
him that right. Tracy said "go ahead and sign that slip 
because everybody has to have time to decide to do a 
job that big or not" so plaintiff signed and didn't get 
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a copy (R. 134). Charlesworth took the paper but says 
he doesn't have it (R. 135). This paper gave Charles-
worth 60 <lays to decide whether he would build and 
lease with an option to buy. "I was tied up but he 
wasn't." The name Compact Building Company was on 
the piece of paper. Charlesvvorth was to buy the land, 
build, and lease to plaintiff the .. Magna site (R. 135). 
Plaintiff told Dinius and Tracy he was interested in 
more than a bow ling alley and the site was too small. 
He and Ida Young had found another site to which he 
took Tracy and Dinius. Tracy said it was a wonderful 
site, on the high side of the road, with good location and 
it was fine with them (R. 136-137). 
Between the first meeting with Charlesworth and 
April 11, when a contract was signed, there were about 
three meetings between Tracy, Charlesworth and Jar-
dine at the Brunswick office looking at plans (R. 140). 
Tracy told plaintiff "if anything went wrong - there 
was any chance he couldn't build the building, there were 
other contractors he could get." (R. 141). 
Exhibit P-4 calls for a down payment of $9,000.00 
to be made by Jardine and repaid by Charlesworth. 
This subject was discussed by Dinius, Charlesworth, 
Ida Young, .Jardine and his son two or three times. 
The main one was at the Indigo Cafe as a result of a 
telephone call from Brunswick by either Tracy or 
Dinius and an invitation to go to the Indigo with Dinius 
and Charlesworth and discuss getting the building mov-
ing (R. 146). Dinius called and said he had hold of 
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Jack and wanted to discuss this subject. Jardine, J\irs. 
Young and Dee went in one car and Dinius and Charles-
worth came together. After a nice lunch "The problem 
was brought up about Jack not having the down pay-
ment for this ground" because his money was "tied up" 
and he wondered if Jardine would advance the down 
payment. "Carl Dinius said if this would hurry the thing 
and get it in gear he thought it would be a good thing, 
so before this meeting was let out, I told them I would 
advance the money for it." (R. 147). The figure men-
tioned was $9,000.00 (R. 148). "I remember that Dinius 
said if we can get this thing started now, we will have 
it open for the leagues. If it drags on getting started 
we could get in trouble for the fall leagues. But I was 
anxious to get the thing going and had the money and 
since that was their recommendation, I didn't think it 
was wrong to go ahead and do it." ( R. 148). 
After the meeting, Ida Young prepared Exhibit 
P-5 based on the conversation with Charlesworth and 
Dinius that the money was to be paid back before it 
would be needed for the bowling equipment (R. 149). 
Exhibit P-9 was the lease with option to buy on 
an earnest money form prepared by Ida Young and 
signed on May 25 (R. 152). At that time construction 
had not started. Harold Tracy, Dinius and Jardine 
were concerned about getting the building started. Ida 
Young called and said Charlesworth had called her and 
wondered if Jardine would advance "this other $23,-
000.00" as his money was still tied up. Jardine told her 
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if Charlesworth could get a statement from Dobbs that 
it was okey that he would let him have the money. The 
$23,000.00 was the balance of the $32,000.00 down pay-
ment on equipment arranged for in Washington. A few 
days later, Charlesworth brought a note from Dobbs to 
Ida Young and Jardine went over to her office to read 
it ( R. 156) . Jardine called Dobbs on the telephone: "I 
told him J adz had requested this additional $23,000.00, 
that he couldn't seem to get his money released up there 
yet for a few days and asked him if it was all right to 
give him this money. And he said over the phone that 
he thought it was all right but to 'protect' myself. He 
didn't say how to 'protect' myself or what to do about 
'protecting' myself." (R. 157). He got the money from 
\ V ashington and had Charlesworth sign a note Exhibit 
P-11 which was signed by Charlesworth personally and 
in behalf of Compact Building and secured by life in-
surance. 
Construction started soon after the $23,000.00 was 
made available and had bogged down and was in trouble 
by September 4, 1962 (R. 162, 161, 163). 
On cross-examination, Jardine testified that he had 
a bookkeeper in his sawmill business but consulted no 
lawyer: "I didn't have anything to have a lawyer about." 
His enterprises were not profitable as money is made 
nowdays "but they were livings" (R. 181). 
In Renton, the plaintiff employed a lawyer to get 
his property zoned and to prepare a contract with the 
man vrnrki11g the grocery store. The people he purchased 
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his land from had an attorney and plaintiff used him 
(R. 182). His maximum gross income from the sawmill 
business was 15 times $27.00 per day (R. 183). When 
he left Renton, he leased the sawmill with an option to 
buy and had the same attorney draw the lease because 
he didn't know how to do it himself. The lessee went 
broke, the equipment froze and he got salvage only on 
the repossession handled by the same attorney (R. 184-
185). 
He and his wife had talked about Moses Lake, 
Washington, and on a trip back from Salt Lake, they 
stopped and purchased 160 acres from a real estate 
broker, employing no attorney. He farmed the land and 
two or three years later bought another 160 acres and 
then after another two or three years water came on 
the property. These transactions were handled by a real 
estate broker and not an attorney (R. 186). In 1959, 
plaintiff was worth about $250,000.00 consisting of his 
property in Renton, including the sawmill, and the farm 
in Moses Lake ( R. 187-188). 
He discussed the bowling lanes construction with 
Ida Young but didn't "consult her." He made up his 
own mind (R. 183, 198). In reference to Exhibit P-5 
"she was a little bit concerned about this, but I wasn't. 
I felt like that where Brunswick recommended Jack, and 
he had to have this property to get a loan on, that I was 
safe enough in signing it to him." (R. 198). 
He and Ida Young talked about the promissory 
note which is Exhibit P-11 and which she prepared. 
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"She said we 11eeded to have something on this thing, 
and \Ve gol: this note and we thought it was sufficient." 
( R. 200) . They thought they had security for the loan 
of $32,000.00. 
"I was looking for wlial Brunswick had told 
me on the phone. They recommended this man. 
They sent him to me. \Vhcn I got a note besides 
from him all<l his company, I felt like I was plenty 
secure or why would they send him to me in 
the first place?" ) Il. 201). 
He didn't consider going to an attorney on this matter 
(R. 202). He didn't need a lawyer as he depended on 
Brunswick and Ida Young was a real estate broker. He 
has furnished financial statements but has never asked 
for any an<l didn't consider asking for one from Compact 
Builders ( R. 208). "I thought where Brunswick recom-
mended this man, I didn't think I had anything to worry 
about. I was buying nearly $400,000.00 worth of equip-
ment. 
"Q l t \1'as a big transaction wasn't it? 
A Yes. But a company that you buy that 
mueh equipment from would recommend 
somebody that couldn't build the building, 
I just couldn't believe this is true." (R. 
209). 
He went to Hill Field beeause Charlesworth wanted 
to show him the project there but he was not really con-
cerned about it. Charlesworth showed 15 or 20 houses 
under collstruction and a temporary office building (R. 
210). 
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The decision on whether lG or 24< lanes should he 
built depended on Brunswick's surveys ( R. 213). 
Tracy, Dohbs and plaintiff went to see Sid Hormau 
about building the building but Horman wasn't inter-
ested. There was no discussion between the Brunswick 
people and plaintiff of the solvency of Charlesworth or 
Compact Builders. Did he think it strange that Charles-
worth didn't have $9,000.00 available to start the buil<l-
ing? "'V ell, I think this crossed my mind a time or two 
- but - well, in my own business I didn't have on 
occasion money available to jump into something else, 
so I could kind of understand if he had it coming. I didn't 
think there was any problem in this." ( R. 214-215). 
After the loan of $9,000.00 and Charlesworth ap-
proached him for the $23,000.00 was he surprised that 
Charlesworth didn't have it? (R. 218). 
"A 'Vell, they recognized this man, sai<l he 
would have the money on the 15th and they 
didn't need it until later, so I couldn't see 
any complication." (The word "recog-
nized" should obviously be "recommend-
ed") (R. 219-220). 
After Charlesworth had failed in the project and 
deeded the land back, the plaintiff made efforts to get 
the building completed. He talked to Bettilyon Realty 
Company (R. 224); Brunswick attempted to arrange 
a loan with A. R. Guss Corporation, John Price turned 
it down, A .. M. F. didn't have the money and wouldn't 
interfere with a Brunswick Building, all after the liens 
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had been picked up on the building (R. 225). The Court 
took judicial notice of the Conesco file Third District 
Court Action No. 138888 (R. 226-227). The creditors 
reduced their claims in the Conesco action to give a total 
figure which plaintiff could try to finance (R. 227). One 
Rother bought the property and got the benefit of scal-
ing down the amount. Plaintiff continued to seek 
financing and the Brunswick Company proposed Salk 
Company, Tracy and Dobbs did the negotiating (R. 
228). They negotiated with Ledbetter Corporation 
which had movie actors back of it and with the Bowers 
Building, Small Business Administration, Walker Bank, 
Old West Insurance, (R. 229) and Lockhart Company 
(R. 230). Reduction of the claims was from $70,000.00 
to $50,000.00. Rother paid $50,000.00 and held the prop-
erty while plaintiff attempted to get financing (R. 231). 
Dinius and Tracy were present when Charlesworth's 
draws from his building projects were discussed. Dinius 
felt the draw would be okey, in language quoted by the 
Appellant in its Brief at Page 7 and 8 (R. 232, 233). 
Jardine relied on Tracy and the Brunswick Company 
because they brought Charlesworth in (R. 235). The 
size of the portion to be deeded to Compact Building 
Company ·was directed by llarold Tracy (R. 235-236). 
The testimony of Mrs. Ida Y oiing. She is the man-
ager of the mortgage loan department at Beehive State 
Bank ( R. 237) and was a real estate broker for 11 years 
(IL 238). She showed Jardine a number of types of 
businesses ( R. 239) . Before any contact was made with 
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the Brunswick Company, she had contacted builders 
and figured building costs and discussed them with Jar-
dine (R. 240-241). Brunswick wanted J ardine's finan-
cial statement ( R. 242) . 
There were several meetings at Brunswick arouud 
April 11 and statements were made by both Harold 
Tracy and Dinius about Charlesworth's finances, that 
after he completed this building Brunswick themselves 
are going to finance him. Charlesworth knew exactly 
how to build to house the Brunswick lanes and Mrs. 
Young was under the impression from these conversa-
tions "that he had built a good many of them." (R. 252). 
Harold Tracy called Mrs. Young with Charles-
worth there and wanted her to prepare an Earnest 
Money Receipt for Charlesworth which is Exhibit P-17 
and relates to construction by Charlesworth of bowling 
lanes at Pleasant Grove ( R. 253) . 
Charlesworth called her and asked about Jardine 
loaning him "the $23,000.00 that he had ready for his 
bowling equipment down payment." (R. 258-259). 
Dinius remained in Brunswick's employ until after 
August, 1962 (R. 265-266). 
After May 31, when Charlesworth was arranging 
mortgage financing, on the building, Dinius said "it 
didn't make a whole lot of difference. They wanted 1\Ir. 
Charlesworth to try around several different places but 
if he was unable to, Brunswick would finance the build-
ing and Charlesworth on it. He also told me at the time 
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that Brunswick - some of the officers of the Bruns-
wick Corporation were officers in a loan investment 
group and this is where the money would come from." 
(R. ~69). 
At her first meeting of Dinius and Charlesworth 
after the slip had been signed giving Charlesworth an 
option and before the visit to the Charlesworth project 
at Hill Field, the remarks quoted at Page 8 of Appel-
lant's Brief were made (R. 274). "lHr. Dinius stating 
lhat he knew exactly how to build the building for the 
Brunswick lanes. In fact, along with building this build-
ing and knowing how to set it up for the Brunswick 
lanes, ~Ir. Dinius made the remark after .Mr. Charles-
worth completed this project from then on Brunswick 
was going to finance .Mr. Charlesworth on the rest of the 
buildings." ( R. 27 5). This was before advance of the 
$9,ooo.oo ( R. 209). 
J cssie 1ll. Paine testified that he is assistant admin-
istrator of the Utah State Department of Contractors, 
the information in whose files is available to the public. 
The department publishes an annual roster summarizing 
all the contractors (R. 277). Compact Building applied 
for a license July 17, 1961 which was issued September 
11, HHH for Class 2 limiting contracts to $75,000.00 
( R. 280-281). J aek G. Charlesworth took the examina-
tion September 1, 1961. On July 25, 1962, notice was 
sent to Compact Buildings of cancellation of its license 
because it 110 longer financially qualified. Notice of this 
intent had been sent out July 2, 1962 (R. 283-284). 
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The conversation with Dinius about future building 
by Charlesworth which was to be financed by Brunswick 
occurred before the $9,000.00 was advanced by Jardine 
(R. 290). 
Jack G. Charles·worth testified he had been in the 
construction business for 15 years (R. 291). He became 
acquainted with Dinius, Tracy and Dobbs of Brunswick 
Corporation in 1961 after a letter "asking them if they 
would be interested in financing or being interested in 
my putting up a building with some of their assistance" 
following which Tracy came to see him ( R. 292). 
Exhibit P-5 was signed on about April 11 con-
nected with the conversation in Ida Young's office which 
followed by a few days a conversation in a restaurant 
between Carl Dinius, Charlesworth, Ida Young and 
Jardine. Before the meeting he and Brunswick had 
discussed it, first with Tracy and Dinius, then with 
Dinius, Jardine not being present. He and Dinius went 
to the restaurant together ( R. 293-294) . 
Exhibit P-10 was signed by Mr. Dobbs in his pres-
ence (R. 294). He had previously talked to Dinius 
about the matter and after talking to Dinius had talked 
to Ida Young also before he talked to Dobbs (R. 295). 
He had more than one conyersation with Dinius as they 
were meeting regularly "trying to get this together" 
(R. 296). He means get them together mentally (R. 
297). 
His conversation with .Mr. Dinius was that things 
weren't going too "·ell at Hill Field and he had to fiwl 
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some other source of revenue if he was going to go ahead 
with the bowling alley. In his conversation with Dinius, 
he learned that J ar<line had money that had been set 
aside to make the down payment on the bowling equip-
ment. And with this information he went to l\Irs. Young 
to see if he could borrow that money, and she told him 
that if he was able to get Brunswick to give permission 
to use it for a little while, on the assumption he would 
be able to get it back, they would go ahead and release 
the money ( ll. 297) . :Mrs. Young got in touch with 
Jardine and he agreed "providing I was fairly certain 
that I would have it back in time to pay for the sight 
draft when the equipment arrived." (R. 298). He told 
Dinius that and then talked to Dobbs after Dinius had 
done so ( H. 298) . 
I thought the letter might be a little soft and I asked 
Dobbs if that's all he could put in there and he said yes 
so I accepted the letter as it was (R. 299). 
P-11, the promissory note, includes the $23,000.00 
contemplated by P-10 and the $9,000.00 advanced on 
April 11 ref erred to on P-5 ( R. 300) . 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 
1. The Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close 
of plaintiff's case should have been granted because the 
eYidence constituting plaintiff's case in chief does not 
show a cause of action generally. 
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2. Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
3. Plaintiff is barred from recovery because of a 
release executed by him. 
4. The findings of fact and conelusions of law do 
not support an award and the judgment is contrary to 
law. 
The Appellant has taken the nine requirements of 
a fraud action from St,uck v. Delta Land and Water 
Company, 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, and then argued that 
no one of the nine points was established by plaintiff's 
evidence. These tests, as modified by the pre-trial order, 
the statements of counsel and the view of the District 
Court will be argued. 
Points two and three will also be argued. 
Appellant's point four is that the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law do not support an award and 
the judgment is contrary to law. This point is dismissed 
by the Appellant at Page 31 of its Brief with the state-
ment that the findings and conclusions ignore appellant's 
first three points. In other words, the Appellant is 
abandoning his fourth point except as prevailing on one 
of the other three points affects the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment. 
There is no challenge that the findings of fact sup-
port the conclusions of law and that these support the 
judgment, and no attack on the :Memorandum Decision 
is made. 
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POINTS TO TIE ARGUED 
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss at the dose of 
plaintiff's case was properly denied. 
2. There is no evidence of contributory negligence. 
a. Plaintiff is not barred Ly any release executed 
in the Conesco action. 
POINT I. DEFENDANT'S lHOTION TO 
DISl\IISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE 'VAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
The first cause of action ( R. 1), and the pre-trial 
order (R. 8) set forth representations by the defendant 
as to Charlesworth and reasonable reliance thereon by 
the plaintiff to his damage, the plaintiff contending that 
the defendant either knew or should have known that 
the representations ·were false. 
In the Court's .Memorandum Decision, the fourth 
requirement of a cause of action for deceit is stated by 
the Court to be: 
"That defendant negligently or recklessly 
made the assertion as a fact without reasonable 
grounds to believe it to Le true." (R. 62). 
"Tith this change, we shall consider the elements 
of an action for deceit as analyzed in the Stuck case, 
as did the trial court in its carefully considered and 
written memorandum decision ( R. 62-78). 
Appellant points out that the evidence is to be con-
sidered most fayorably to the Respondent. This is the 
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review of defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint 
at the close of plaintiff's evidence in a case tried before 
the Court without a jury, in accordance with Rule 41 ( b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This situation 
was considered by this Court in Jf7inegar v. Slim Olsen, 
Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205, where the Court estab-
lished the rule in this type of case, the trial judge in that 
case having granted the motion for non-suit at the close 
of plaintiff's evidence. The review was held to be: 
"Taking the evidence and the inferences most 
favorable to the plaintiff. * * * True, normally 
a Court acting without a jury should not grant 
a motion for non-suit when there is some com-
petent, substantial evidence to support every 
issue to make a case, if the evidence on all these 
issues is credible." 
See also: Lawrence v. Bll1nbcrr;cr R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 
335; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 
P. 2d 30. 'Ve shall, therefore, consider the evidence 
from plaintiff's case favorably to the plaintiff and the 
inferences flowing therefrom. The elements of the deceit 
action will be argued as stated by Judge Croft in his 
Memorandum Decision (R. 62). 
(a) Representation of An El1'i.~·ting Fact. 
Mr. Jardine informed Harold Tracy in one of 
their first meetings that he knew nothing about the 
bowling business, needed to have a building constructed 
for him, and leased to him, and that his finances were 
limited (R. 127, 134). He made a trip to \Vashington 
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to raise money and came back with $32,000.00 available 
for the purpose of buying bowling equipment from the 
defendant of which he informed Tracy and entered into 
a contract calling for the $32,000.00 down ( R. 130). 
Tracy and Dinius stated that finding a Luilder to 
do this job \vas not difficult and never at any time 
suggested to plaintiff that he should go out and find 
a buil<ler, but led him to believe that this \Vas a part 
of their service and they would find someone who could 
construct the building, complete it and lease it to the 
plaintiff in which to house the equipment plaintiff was 
purchasing from defendant. Indeed, the fact that 
Brunswick optioned a site at .Magna, held numerous 
conferences with the builder alone and with the builder 
and Jardine together, and assumed responsibility for 
seeing that the building was moving, bear out this role 
of defendant and its employees Dobbs, Tracy and 
Dinius. This conduct amounted to representations by 
Brunswick that it undertook to get investor and builder 
together with the operator and purchaser of the equip-
ment as a ~;ervice incident to the sale of equipment in 
an amount ,vhich far exceeded the cost of the building 
and land combined ( $360,000.00 for equipment, $240,-
000.00 for building and $4,000.00 for land [R. 129, 
130 and 133 and 139 J). 
Tracy called .T ardine on the telephone and told 
him he had a builder named Jack Charlesworth and 
arranged to lrnve them meet at Brunswick's offices with 
Brunswick people (R. 132). 
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It is important to note that Charlesworth had never 
constructed a building for Brunswick, and there is no 
evidence that he ever constructed a large building for 
anybody, and certainly no evidence that Brunswick 
knew of any building Charlesworth had constructed, 
except that he was planning some type of project at 
Riverdale, Utah in 1961 and had something to do with 
building houses at Hill Field in 1962 (R. 292, 215-
216, 210). The initial contact between Charlesworth and 
Brunswick was by Charlesworth in the Fall of 1961 
when he inquired in connection with his Riverdale proj-
ect whether Brunswick "would be interested in financ-
ing or being interested in my putting up a bowling alley 
with some of their assistance" ( R. 392) following which 
Tracy came to see him. So Tracy knew and Brunswick 
is charged with knowing that Charlesworth didn't have 
financing in late 1961. 
By this time, Jardine had signed a contract to pur-
chase $360,000.00 worth of equipment from Brunswick 
(R. 130) and had been sent to a Brunswick manager's 
school in Chicago (R. 131) with a statement that when 
he got back "they would have the set up for the building 
of the building." (R. 131). 
In introducing Jack Charlesworth, Mr. Tracy 
said: 
( 1) Jack Charlesworth is president of Compact 
Building Company. 
( 2) He could build these buildings. 
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( 3) II c could finance these buildings. 
( 4) There is nothing to worry about. 
( 5) Sign the slip giving Charlesworth 60 days to 
decide because everybody has to have time to decide to 
do a job that big. 
( 6) Just prior to the advance of the first $9,000.00, 
Dinius sai<l that Charlesworth "knew exactly how to 
build the buildings in order to house the Brunswick 
lanes" and gave the "impression he had built a goorr 
many of them." 
(7) Tracy told Jardine that if anything went 
wrong there were other contractors he could get, imply· 
ing that Brunswick would see to it. 
( 8) Dinius told Jardine that Charlesworth "had a 
mce setup" at his Hill Field project. 
These were representations of fact within the re-
quirements of a cause of action for deceit. 
In Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, 
Page 560, this definition of "fact'" is given: 
"The courts will ordinarily classify a state-
ment as fact if it relates to an event or state of 
affairs which either exists at the present moment 
or has had a past existence and if that event or 
state of affairs is susceptible of knowledge. Un-
der this definition statements relating to the 
future are not fact; neither are statements relat-
ing to matters impossible of ascertainment at the 
time made." 
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Expressions of financial condition of a third person 
may be actionable for fraudulent misrepresentation or 
"An opinion stated with such conscious ignor-
ance of its truth to be equivalent to a falsehood, 
or an opinion stated as being based on a careful 
investigation was not made, or a statement made 
in the form of an opinion, but meant to impress 
and impressing the mjured party as a statement 
of fact may be actionable. 
"Where the representation is made as a posi-
tive statement of fact, however, it (the other ele-
ments of fraud being preo;ent) may impose lia-
bility even though the speaker actually believes 
in the existence of facts on which he bases his 
assertion. Under such circumstances, the repre-
sentation may properly be relied on, and without 
investigation." 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §48a. 
In D1wcan v. Ston,eham, 253 N. Y. 183, 170 N. E. 
571, the defendant who was in a business relationship 
to the plaintiff advised him: 
"'Ve have investigated :Messrs. E. II. Clark 
and Company and believe them to be financially 
responsible and fully capable of carrying out 
any obligations they assume in the taking over 
of this business." 
which was held not to be a mere opinion or prophecy 
but a statement that investigation had been made and 
belief formed thereon, uttered as though defendant 
intended that plaintiff would rely on it. 
In Murray v. Lamb, 174 Ore. 239, 148 P.2d 797, 
801, the defendant had represented to a prospective 
lender that he had financial ability and that he "was 
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erecting or about to erect" a basilica in a nearby town. 
The Court held that these were more than expressions 
of opinion and that the plaintiff was justified in relying 
on them. 
In Broaddus Company v. Binkley, (Tex. App. 
1932) 54 S.,V.2<l 586, the court found that plaintiff 
through its agent falsely and negligently represented 
to defendants that the tenants who had leases on certain 
property were financially sound. Defendant relied upon 
this representation as a material inducement in signing 
the contract of exchange. The court affirmed this hold-
ing that the plaintiff undertook to state facts concern-
ing responsibility making it appear that he had investi-
gated the facts and negotiated the lease. He assumed 
to speak with knowledge of the facts and what he stated 
was, therefore a representation of fact rather than ex-
pression of opinion and no independent inquiry or 
investigation was required. 
In Granberg v. 'l'urnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 
333 P.2d 423, it is held that representations made to 
one person with intention that they will be repeated 
to another and acted upon by him and which are so 
repeated and so acted upon will support an action as 
much as if the representation had been made directly. 
This is cited for the reason that Mrs. Ida Young was 
also the receipient of representations, which, it may be 
inf erred, were made with the intention that they be 
relayed to plaintiff as they in fact were. See also Ellis 
v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 283, 373 P.2d 382. 
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(b) Its Falsity. 
Compact Buildings Company was not incorporated 
as of February, 1962, and it had no_president. When it 
was incorporated on April 11, 1962, the name first 
listed among the directors and the one listed as regis-
tered agent was Archie P. Beck, who was presumably 
the president, as Compact Building Company had been 
his company (Exhibit P-2 and R. 280). Exhibit P-14 
shows Archie P. Beck as president, and P-14 shows 
Charlesworth as secretary and treasurer. 
Charlesworth's ability to complete the building and 
finance the building is proven false. He was in dire 
financial difficulty at that time (Exhibit P-1); on July 
2, 1962, he was notified by the Department of Con-
tractors that his financial difficulties required cancel-
lation of his license ( R. 284) and he was unable to 
obtain a mortgage on the property ( R. 209 and 268-
269), except a mortgage for $5,500.00 (Exhibit P-12) 
which pitiful amount is eloquent proof of the falsity 
of his ability to finance a $240,000.00 building. 
The statement that there was nothing to worry 
about is a representation that Brunswick was well 
acquainted with Charlesworth and his work and that 
Brunswick and Charlesworth between them would see 
to it that the building was constructed. This was false 
both in its implications that Brunswick was acquainted 
with Charlesworth and in its indication that Brunswick 
was in a position to assure Jardine that there was 
nothing to worry about. 
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The statement that Charlesworth knew how to 
build lanes to house Brunswick equipment and its impli-
cation that Charlesworth was experienced in this fiel<l 
were false. 
Brunswick knew or was charged with knowing that 
Charlesworth had no ability to finance buildings because 
in his initial request to Brunswick, he had asked whether 
Brunswick would either finance him or assist him in 
building ( R. 292) . Far from having financial ability 
it is reasonable to assume, from an examination of the 
file in Conesco v. Compact Building, and the nature of 
the liens that the $23,000.00 went not into the Jardine 
project, but was otherwise used. (See R. 215-216). 
And when Charlesworth got into trouble, Bruns-
wick did not come to his rescue and many contacts with 
builders and financers proved fruitless (R. 224-225, 
228-230). 
The "nice set-up" which Dinius spoke of produced 
nothing toward the building of plaintiff's building and 
Charlesworth had to seek other financing ( R. 297) . 
(c) Its Materiality. 
Jardine was most recently a trucker, a farmer, a 
sawmill operator, and a builder of three buildings cost-
ing a total of $27 ,000.00, with an eighth grade educa-
tion, suffering from asthma and slowed up mentally 
by taking cortisone for 14 years. He had no experience 
in the bow ling business and no experience dealing with 
general contractors. He supplied a financial statement, 
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told defendant he had no means of constructing a build-
ing but could raise enough money to make a down 
payment on equipment and accepted Brunswick's offer 
of help in finding someone to finance and build a build-
ing to be leased to him. I3runswick diligently under-
took this and knew that when Dr. King was unable 
to go forward, Jardine had no place to turn and the 
project was at that point dead. 
Brunswick revived the project by telling Jardine 
they had Jack Charlesworth and brought them together 
for the purposeof getting a building built in order to 
accommodate a sale of $360,000.00 worth of equipment. 
Jardine was impressed with the importance of the 
Brunswick name, and had full confidence in what its 
people were doing and upon Tracy's recommendation, 
without ever having seen Charlesworth before, com-
mitted himself to have Charlesworth build his building, 
binding himself and giving Charlesworth 60 days to 
decide. Mr. Tracy told Jardine the very things about 
Charlesworth that would induce him to place reliance 
on the stranger. 
Brunswick led Jardine to believe that it had prior 
experience with Charlesworth, that he could perform 
the job and that it stood back of him. 
( d) That Defendant N e,gligently Or Recklessl.lf 
Made The Assertion As A Fact Without Reasonable 
Ground,s To Believe It To Be True. 
One of the first things Brunswick required of 
Jardine was a personal financial statement (R. 208, 
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242). He reasonably assumed that the same thing was 
required of Charlesworth and that Brunswick knew 
Charlesworth from prior dealing and that Brunswick 
was aware of Charlesworth's financial condition just 
as they were aware of his. Brunswick was warned of 
the possibility that Charlesworth was not financially 
stable by Charlesworth's request for financial help 
when he first contacted Brunswick in the Fall of 1961 
(R. 292). A credit investigation or a check of the 
county records would have disclosed numerous judg-
ments against Charlesworth personally, Charlesworth's 
companies, and Archie Beck and Compact Building 
Company (Exhibit P-1). A telephone call to the 
Department of Contractors would have disclosed that 
Charlesworth was not the president of Compact Build-
ing Company, was not licensed to handle a $240,000.00 
building and after July 2, that the company was in 
financial difficulty. Also, Charlesworth told Dinius that 
things were not going well at Hill Field and he had 
to have other financing ( R. 297) . 
The Urunswick Company had a legal responsibility 
to inform itself before it recklessly embarked the plain-
tiff and Charlesworth on a big building venture in which 
Brunswick stood to benefit greatly if it succeeded, and 
would expect to suffer no loss if it failed, knew of 
J ardine's reliance, and was immediately aware at the 
first conference and was continuously aware that there-
after Jardine looked to Brunswick for guidance and 
assumed that Brunswick was well acquainted with 
Charlesworth and his company and had full confidence 
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in them. This type of representation, without knowl-
edge of the facts whereof one speaks and recommends, 
incurs legal responsibility. 
Brunswick was not a Yolunteer. Jardine came to 
Brunswick to do business and entered into a large con-
tract, tying up all his available assets before Brunswick 
turned to the problem of getting a building to house 
the equipment it had contracted. It had a large stake 
in the success of the project and was obligated to protect 
its trusting purchaser against a financially irresponsible 
commitment. 
It is well established that representations of finan-
cial condition or other facts, made with the intention 
that they be relied upon, are actionable and this is 
especially true where some relationship exists between 
the parties from which the representee is entitled to 
assume that the representor would use care to be 
informed before speaking, knowing that the repre-
sentee is relying on the statements made. The state-
ment must be made under circumstances which indicate 
that the representee will rely on the statement and does 
in fact rely. 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 48 (a). 
The elements of such an action are that the repre-
sentation be one of fact, which was known to be untrue 
or else recklessly made, for the intent of deceiving 
and that the other party was induced to act upon it 
and did rely upon it to his injury. 23 Am. J ur., Frau,d 
and Deceit, § 20. 
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The Restatement of Torts no'v going into its Sec-
ond series, in the 11th and 12th tentative drafts, recog-
niz.es the right of action against 
"one who, in the course of his business, profes-
sion or employment, or a transaction in which he 
has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary 
loss caused to them by the justifiable reliance 
upon such information, if he fails to exercise rea-
sonable care or competence in obtaining or com-
municating the information." 
The comments indicate that the duty extends to those 
not directly engaged in the transaction but have a 
pecuniary interest in it such as corporate officers and 
promoters who furnish information which indirectly 
benefits them. 
In Ellis v. Hale, supra, this Court upheld an order 
dismissing a complaint attempting to allege negligent 
misrepresentation. The Court noted, however, that 
negligent representation will sustain an action when 
made with the intention that it be relied on and is made 
without reasonable diligence or competence in ascer-
taining the verity of the assertion and when there is 
a special duty of care running from the representor to 
the representee. The Court also noted that if equivocal 
or ambiguous language is used intentionally "with the 
hope that one of several meanings will be understood 
by the representee" a situation would be presented 
which could well result in liability. 
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In International Products Company t'. Erie Rail-
way Company, 244 N.Y. a:n, 155 NJfi. t>62, u(i4, the 
plaintiff inquired as to arrival of goods upon defend-
ant's dock so as to obtain insurance. The defendant 
acknowledged arrival and designated the dock on which 
the goods were placed, whieh information was errone-
ous. The goods were destroyed by fire without coverage. 
The court found liability against the defendant for its 
negligent representation: 
"Liability in such cases arises only where there 
is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct 
information. And that inn>lves many considera-
tions. There must be knowledge, or its equivalent, 
that the information is desired for a serious pur-
pose; that he to whom it is givei1 intends to rely 
on it; that if false or erroneous, he will because 
of it be injured in person or property. Finally, 
the relationship of the parties, arising out of con-
tract or otherwise, must be such that in morals 
and conscience the one has the right to rely upon 
the other for information, and the other giving 
information owes a duty to give it with care.*** 
Words negligently spoken may justify the recov-
ery of the proximate damages caused by faith 
in their accuracy." 
Assurances that a man owned 160 acres of land, 
had a good credit rating with fine bank standing, and 
that plaintiff would have a first mortgage on a thresher 
being sold was found actionable in Freernan v. Har-
baugh Co., 114 Minn. 283, 130 N. ,V. l llO. False infor-
mation given by a publie weigher, resulting from negli-
gence was held actionable in the leading case of Glanzer 
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v. Shepard, ~33 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275; and in Swan-
son v. Solomon, (\Vash. 1957) 314 P.2d 655, where, 
in the sale of the home, the defendants represented that 
there was enough property on either side for a path 
circling the home, which was discoverable by survey 
but negligently made. lHisrepresentations as to figures 
of cost given by the defendant to the purchasing plain-
tiff were actionable because negligently made in Clar 
v. Board of Trade of San Jl'rancisco, (Cal. App., 1958) 
331 P.2d 8!J at 95. Representations as to a letter of 
credit which actually had expired was negligent and 
actionable in Courteen Seed Company v. Hong Kong 
& Shanghai Banking Corporation, 245 N. Y. 377, 157 
N.E. 272. Negligent representation of ownership of a 
lot was actionable in Pattridge v. You1nans, 107 Colo. 
122, 109 P.2d 646. 
( e) The Defendant's Intent That It Should Be 
Acted U pun B;t; The Person To Whom It is Made And 
In The Manner Reasonably Contemplated. 
It is plain from what has previously been said that 
the very purpose of getting the plaintiff and Charles-
worth together was to get a building constructed so 
as to house equipment to be sold by the defendant to 
the plaintiff. That was the purpose of the contacts with 
Dr. King, with Sid Horman and with Charlesworth . 
.T ardine was a virtual stranger in Salt Lake City and 
defendant knew this from the facts that his holdings 
were in 'Vashington and he had to go there to see about 
raising money (R. 129-131). Defendant's intent that 
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the representations be acted upon is made plain by 
the fact that when Charlesworth requested, in the first 
meeting, that Jardine commit himself and give Charles-
worth 60 days to think it over, Tracy urged J ardinc 
to sign the slip advising him that it was reasonable, 
there then being no information about Charlesworth 
except Tracy's statements and recommendations con-
cerning him and the circumstances of the positions of 
the parties, Jardine placiug himself in a position of 
reliance upon Brunswick with no ability to go forward 
except with persons Brunswick could produce. 
Defendant's intent continued through the entire 
negotiations. Tracy and Dinius reassured Jardine when 
Charlesworth was having trouble finding money that 
Brunswick would finance him if he had no other source, 
that Brunswick intended to have Charlesworth as their 
builder, in that Brunsv,:ick sent two other negotiations 
between Charlesworth and bowling alley proprietors 
over to Mrs. Young for integration, and in the fact 
before Jardine undertook any step ·with reference to 
the purchase of the land, the division of the land, ad-
vancing the down payment for Charlesworth, and iu 
loaning the $9,000.00 and the $2a,ooo.oo, he conferred 
extensively with Dinius and Tracy and later with Dobbs 
and obtained their approval on all that was done. 
Dinius and Charlesworth together planned the re-
quest for the loan of the $9,000.00 down payment on 
the land. They came together to the meeting and pre-
sented a joint plan-Bnmswick endorsing Charles-
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worth and requesting the advance (R. 147-148, 249). 
And it was Dinius who told Charlesworth there was 
another $2B,OOO.OO being held which might as well be 
used to get the building going, which was of great 
concern to Brunswick (R. 156-157, 297). And Jardine 
this time, through 1\iirs. Young, told Charlesworth he'd 
have to have a letter from Brunswick (R. 156, 259, 207 
and Exhibit P. 10). And when the letter wasn't clear-cut 
he called Dobbs on the phone to get re-assurance, which 
Dobbs gave in such manner and language as to satisfy 
Jardine (R. 157, 200, 201) which Dobbs knew from 
the telephone conversation as well as from Charles-
worth's request and the nature of the letter. 
In Duncan v. Stoneham, supra, the court noted 
that defendants had placed no limitations upon use of 
their representation, thus supporting the intent that 
it be acted upon. 
The Restatement of Torts 2d, Draft Nos. II and 
12 of Section 552, indicates that some cases hold that 
the representor must know the party who intends to 
rely on the information before liability will ensue. 
Others require only an intent that it be acted on by 
someone of a class. Under either test, plaintiff was 
justified here in relying on the representations. 
As contemplated by 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 48a, the rep-
resentations here made were meant to impress Jardine 
and were a material inducement in causing him to rely 
on Charlesworth m the manner intended by the rep-
resentor. 
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In the article at 24 Harvard Law Review, 415, 
at 423, Professor Bohlen cites Stiff' v. Ashton, 155 
.Mass. 133, 133 for the rule that 
"If, without more, the plaintiff spoke or acted 
falsely, knowing or having cause to believe that 
his words or conduct reasonably might influence 
the defendant's action" 
the defendant is liable. 
(f) Plaintiff's Ignorance Of Its Falsity. 
There is no evidence ,vhatever that Jardine knew 
that Charlesworth was unable to complete this building 
until bills were unpaid on the job, laborers began to 
request payment of wages, and Charlesworth finally 
gave a deed asking for two weeks' time in which to pull 
himself out. 
It is true that the plaintiff knew that Charles-
worth's money was tied up and was not readily avail-
able, and that he was having trouble in completing 
his mortgage, but no evidence that he ever suspected 
that Charlesworth was financially exhausted and unable 
to borrow on the abundant assets he must have had 
to be entitled to Brunswick's endorsement, which was 
without limitation, until the phone call between Dobbs 
and Jardine in which full go-ahead was given except 
that Jardine should "protect"' himself. This could have 
meant only that the money should be advanced, that 
Charlesworth was good for the money, and that Jardine 
should make the amount and the pay-back definite and 
assured. 
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(g) Plaintiff's Reliance Upon Its Truth. 
The trial court's :Memorandum Decision sum-
marizes the testimony and then makes an appraisal 
of the evidence in the last two pages of the decision. 
After referring to the nature and extent of the mis-
representations the trial judge stated that the Bruns-
wick personnnel 
"Thereafter by their continued presence and 
guidance influenced plaintiff's actions in advanc-
ing money to Charlesworth in such negotiations 
with knowledge that plaintiff was relying on de-
fendant's employees for such guidance to a mate-
rial extent." (R. 77). 
Plaintiff's evidence as a whole discloses that plain-
tiff went to the Brunswick company with a half-formed 
notion that he would like to operate and own some 
bowling lanes and was welcomed with open arms by 
Messrs. Dobbs, Tracy and Dinius, who undertook to 
adapt Jardine's finanical ability to the area where 
lanes could profitably operate and to find someone who 
could deliver the building to Jardine. The plaintiff put 
himself in their hands and looked to them for their 
approval of his every step. This was both reasonable 
and logical. Jardine was much impressed by the name 
Brunswick and by the interest which the Brunswick 
people showed in the project. The Brunswick company 
stood to make profit on a very large transaction and 
therefore had at least an equal stake with the plaintiff 
in construction of the project. Brunswick had imme-
diately requested J ardine's financial statement and 
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there was no reason for him not to place full reliance 
on the advice of this large corporation acting through 
its very much interested and very much involved per-
sonnel. 
At the first meeting and in response to Tracy's 
urgings, the plaintiff gave Charlesworth a 60-day option 
to proceed with the building ( R. 134) . Having pre-
viously looked at a site in the Cottonwood area ( R. 
240), he abandoned it in favor of the .Magna site at 
the suggestion of Din us and Tracy ( R. 136-137) and 
got their approval on the site ultimately selected (R. 
137, 245). 
At a meeting with Dinius and upon his urging "be-
fore this meeting was let out, I told them I would 
advance the money for it," which was $9,000.00 (R. 
147). He did this "since that was their recommenda-
tion" (R. 148). 
Tracy and Dinius gave plaintiff the impression 
that Charlesworth had built a good many bowling lanes 
for them (R. 252, 275). 
Plaintiff told Ida Young he would loan Charles-
worth "this other $23,000.00" if Charlesworth could 
get a statement from Dobbs that it was okey (R. 156). 
'Vhen he called Dobbs on the telephone, he "asked him 
if it was all right to give this money" ( R. 157). He 
then proceeded to get the money from 'V ashigton to 
be available for Charlesworth ( R. 159). 
Jardine had not customarily employed attorneys 
(R. 182, 186, 208). 
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"I felt like that where Brunswick recommended 
Jack, and he had to have this property to get a 
loan on, that I was safe enough in signing it to 
him." (R. 198). "I was looking for what Bruns-
wick had told me on the phone. They recom-
mended this man. They sent him to me. When I 
got a note besides, from him and his company, 
I felt like I was plenty secure or why would they 
send him to me in the first place?" (R. 201). 
''I thought where Brunswick recommended this 
man, I didn't think I had anything to worry 
about. I was buying nearly $400,000.00 worth of 
equipment. *** But a company that you buy that 
much equipment from would recommend some-
body that couldn't build the building, I just 
couldn't believe this is true." ( R. 209). 
"'V ell, they recommended this man, said he 
would have the money on the 15th and they didn't 
need it until later, so I couldn't see any compli-
cation.'' (R. 220). 
(h) Plaintiff's Right To Rely Thereon. 
A reading of the transcript of plaintiff's evidence 
plainly shows that plaintiff was relying on Appellant's 
employees and conferred with them on so many occa-
sions that they were compelled to know of this reliance. 
In addition, Tracy and Dinius took the initiative in 
getting plaintiff signed up, in getting plaintiff and 
Charlesworth together and in seeing that arrangements 
were made to enable Charlesworth to proceed with the 
construction. There was never an occasion when plain-
tiff ceased to rely on the Brunswick people, or when 
the Brunswick people told him that he was on his own 
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and could no longer rely on what they had told him 
about Charlesworth, a stranger with whom he had con-
tracted upon Brunswick's recommendation. These are 
the facts which caused the trial court to conclude: 
"The Brunswick personnel played this active 
role notwithstanding they did not have personal 
knowledge concerning Charlesworth's back-
ground as a builder, or lack thereof; did not obtain 
either a financial statement from or a credit report 
on Charlesworth which if obtained would un-
doubtedly have revealed to defendant the long list 
of judgments against Charlesworth as set forth 
in case File No. 138888, that is the Conesco file 
mentioned above. 
In doing so, the Brunswick personnel not only 
negligently or recklessly made the assertion that 
Charlesworth was able to construct the needed 
building to house the Brunswick equipment to be 
purchased by plaintiff without reasonable 
grounds to believe it to be true, but thereafter 
by their continued presence and guidance influ-
enced plaintiff's actions in advancing money to 
Charlesworth in such negotiations with knowl-
edge that plaintiff was relying on defendant's 
employees for such guidance to a material extent. 
In my opinion these factors constitute more than 
a negligent or reckless expression of opinion con-
cerning Charlesworth's ahilit~, to build and in my 
judgment formed the basis for liability for the 
consequent and proximate damage to the plain-
tiff." 
In support of the Court's summary conclusion on 
this aspect of the case, we briefly point out some of the 
acts of the Brunswick employees which caused plain-
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tiff to place implicit confidence in them and their recom-
mendation of Jack Charlesworth and his company: 
Brunswick had an option on a bowling lane site 
(R. 128); they said several building contractors were 
available and encouraged plaintiff to go to Washington 
to inquire about finances (R. 130); they sent him to 
Chicago to a manager's school and said "when I got 
back they would have the setup for the building of 
the building" ( R. 13-) ; Tracy said he had a builder 
and invited plaintiff to Brunswick's office to negotiate 
a contract ( R. 132) ; Tracy urged plaintiff to give 
Charlesworth an immediate option with no opportunity 
for Jardine to make any investigation (R. 134); Tracy 
and Dinius approved plaintiff's ultimate site (R. 136-
137) ; told him if anything went wrong there were other 
contractors available (R. 141) ; Dinius and Charles-
worth developed the plan for borrowing the original 
$9,000.00 and came together to make the proposition 
(R. 146-147, 249); Dinius informed Charlesworth that 
plaintiff had another $23,000.00 being held in reserve 
(R. 156, 295-296) ; Charlesworth then discussed the 
matter with Dinius and then with Dobbs under circum-
stances which plainly showed that Jardine was going to 
rely on Brunswick's recommendation (R. 56, 295-
297); on the telephone Dobbs approved the loan, know-
ing full well that Jardine was relying on him and was 
going to advance the money, the words to "protect 
yourself" reasonably meaning only to require a definite 
document and not possibly meaning not to rely on what 
Dobbs was saying (R. 156-158); Brunswick decided 
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whether 16 or 24 lanes should be built (R. 213) ; the 
Brunswick people had never discussed with plaintiff 
the solvency of Charlesworth or Compact Builders 
(R. 124-215) ; Charlesworth's explanation of the delay 
in getting his money on about April 11 was made in the 
presence of Dinius, who then urged plaintiff to advance 
the money (R. 248) ; before the $23,000.00 was ad-
vanced, Tracy and Dinius told plaintiff that after this 
building was completed, Brunswick was going to finance 
Charlesworth (R. 269, 275, 290); in the early stages 
of financing, Dinius said if Charlesworth couldn't get 
his financing, Brunswick would take care of it ( R. 
269); Charlesworth met with Dinius regularly trying 
to get this together (R. 296) ; and Dinius and Charles-
worth together urged the advances (R. 297); Dobbs' 
attention was drawn to the use of the letter (Exhibit 
P-10) by Charlesworth's reference to it as "too soft" 
and the knowledge therefrom of the use Charlesworth 
intended to make of the letter ( R. 299). 
Generally speaking, the law is that a person has a 
right to rely on misrepresentations if he is one of the 
persons for whose benefit and guidance the information 
was intended and relies in a transaction in which it was 
intended to influence his conduct, as stated in Restate-
ment of Torts, § 552, and confirmed in the tentative 
draft. Broaddus Companv v. Binkley, supra, (pur-
chaser of real estate as to credit of tenants) ; Granberg 
v. Turnham, supra, (zoning of real property represen-
tation on listing agreement relied on by purchaser) ; 
International Products Company 'L'. Eric R. Company, 
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supra (location of goods for insurance purposes) ; 
Freeman v . .EI arbaugh, supra (purchaser of promis-
sory note given for part payment of threshing machine 
and representations by holders of notes as to credit 
rating and bank standing of maker); Glanzer v. Shep-
ard, supra ("Weight of merchandise furnished by a public 
weigher to a third party purchaser) ; Duncan v. Stone-
harn, supra (financial stability of a stock broker to whom 
the plaintiff transferred his account concerning obliga-
tions toward customers of the defendant other than the 
plaintiff as well as the plaintiff) ; Clar v. Board of 
Trade of San Francisco, supra (cost figures on plumb-
ing inventory given by Trustee and assignee for benefit 
of creditors of a bankrupt corporation to the pur-
chaser); nJurray v. Lamb, sup~a, (money loaned on 
representations concerning the borrower's financial 
ability and that he was erecting or about to erect a 
basilica); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corporation, 
31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E. 2d 769, 773-779, (reliance on 
a volunteer who inspected cables for itself as insurance 
carrier and released the information, reviewing the 
principles discussed at 187 N.E. 2d 425, 446-453); 
Ellis v. Ilale, supra, 13 Utah 2d 279, (where liability 
refused because information concerning approval of 
subdivision not intended to motivate the plaintiff) ; 
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, (fail-
ure to disclose quarantine because of noxious weeds by 
owner and real estate broker to purchaser of farm) ; 
Harper and James on 'forts, Volume 1, Pages 545 and 
547; 24< HmTanl Law Review, 415 at 423 and 435; 37 
C.J .S., Frand, § 48a. 
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(i) Plaintiff's Comwquent And Proximate Darnage. 
Plaintiff loaned $23,000.00 which was lost, $9,000.00 
with which land was purchased and lost and which was 
the value of the corner traet placed in Compact Build-
ing Company's name, according to plaintiff's evidence 
(R. 342) in addition to the amount of money spent on 
the project incidentally, in preparation for the project 
and before Jardine was aware of Charlesworth's finan-
cial difficulties. The trial court ruled ( R. 78) that money 
spent in salvage of the enterprise after Charlesworth 
became unable to go forward was not recoverable and 
respondent did not cross appeal (Finding 52, R. 96) . 
Plaintiff's evidence was that the building was 
liened beyond its value and that even with creditor's 
claims compromised he was unable to get financing 
and that actually the foreclosure action caused a reduc-
tion of liens in the amount of $20,000 (R. 227 and 230). 
According to plaintiff's evidence, the damage 
proximately caused was far in excess of the amount 
allowed by the Court and there is no challenge as to 
any specific item. 
POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The defense of contributory negligence in an action 
of deceit is not well established. For instance, in 23 
Am. J ur., Fraud and Deceit, § 206, it is said: 
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"Contributory negligence of a vendor or seller, 
making fraud possible, is not, however, a defense 
to an action in tort for damages sustained by 
him. ***." 
And an annotation at 17 4 A.L.R. 1004 says that the 
better view is that negligence of the plaintiff is not a 
defense in an action for intentional fraud. The anno-
tation is devoted specifically to representations as to the 
condition of property where the representee might have 
made an investigation. The tendency of courts is found 
to be that one who has intentionally deceived another 
will not be heard to say that the other ought not to 
have trusted him. 
But where the charge is negligent or reckless mis-
representation, the question properly arises whether 
the representee was really mislead or is simply trying 
to have the courts protect him in his credulity. Either 
on the issue of contributory negligence or as an element 
of the cause of action for deceit, namely right to rely 
on a representation, the reasonableness of the reliance 
by the plaintiff is properly examined and is discussed 
under Point I (h). 
Contributory negligence as such is recognized by 
Professor Bohlen in Articles on :Misrepresentations as 
Deceit or Negligence in 42 Harvard Law Review, 733 
at 739 and 18 Virginia Law Review, 703 at 709. This 
principle is approved as Section 552 (a) in the Re-
statement of Torts 2d, Tentative Drafts 11 and 12, 
available at the University of Utah Law Library. See 
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5 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 
1512; 23 Am. J ur., Fraud § 80. 
In Elder v. Clawson, H Utah 2d 379, 383, 384 P.2d 
802, this Court upheld a judgment of rescission of a 
contract of sale of land for fraud. The representation 
was that the land was valuable for farming. The farm 
had been shown to the plaintiff in which certain noxious 
weeds were pointed out with a statement that they 
ought to be sprayed and that cattle should be brought 
on the premises to feed, but nothing was said about 
quarantine of the farm because of the weed and its 
effect on economic operation of the property. 
In Stuck v. Delta Land & 1¥ ater Company, plain-
tiff was shown a farm by the owner's agent and noticed 
white material on the surface and asked if it was alkali 
and was told it was gypsum and not deleterious. It was 
argued by the defendant that plaintiff had no right 
to rely on such representations when the presence of 
alkali was so wide spread and well known, but the Court 
held that the action lay on the basis of either knowing 
falsity or negligent misrepresentation and plaintiff was 
entitled to rely. 
That Brunswick made the statement recklessly, 
and close to wilfully, does not defeat the cause of action 
based on negligent misrepresentation as found by the 
Court according to Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279 at 
283, 373 p .2d 382. 
A principle similar to the rule of last clear chance 
is evident in 23 Am. J ur., Fraud and Deceit. § 80. This 
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is that knowledge by the representor that the other 
party to the contemplated transaction is acting under 
a mistaken belief as to certain facts is a factor in deter-
mining that a duty of disclosure is owing. If two parties 
are negligent but one becomes aware of the fact that 
the other does not know of his negligence, the one who 
is so aware had a duty to act. So here, Brunswick could 
not avoid being aware that Jardine was relying on the 
statements of Dinius, Tracy and Dobbs, and accepting 
Charlesworth as a person financially able to perform 
and able to carry out his contracts. Charlesworth 's 
original approach to Brunswick seeking financial assist-
ance should have warned Brunswick that Charlesworth 
did not have his own financial backing. And Charles-
worth confided in Dinius that things were not going 
well at l-Iill Field, seeking the help of Dinius to get 
money from Jardine (R. 249, 293). This matter also 
was discussed by Charlesworth and Tracy (R. 294). 
\\Then it became apparent at the meeting at the Indigo 
Cafe that .T ardine was accepting the urgings of Charles-
worth and Dinius, Dinius had a duty to speak because 
he then was compelled to realize that Jardine was not 
aware of Charlesworth's financial inability, and Bruns-
wick and its agents were. This was true again when the 
$23,000.00 was advanced. 
In this case, if the only statements made by the 
defendant had been the statements introducing Charles-
worth, it is reasonable to assume that the questions which 
came to the plaintiff's mind thereafter would have put 
him on inquiry had it not been for the fact that he 
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was in constant touch with the Brunswick people who 
continued to encourage him in accepting Charlesworth 
as financially responsible, the Brunswick builder, the 
expert in Brunswick construction, a person whom 
Bruns;vick would finance if need be and one with whom 
Brunswick was constantly working in order to get 
plaintiff's building constructed even though it involved 
requiring advances from plaintiff's funds. Brunswick 
was on hand to answer plaintiff's questions, which were 
always answered in accordance with the misrepresen-
tations. 
Plaintiff's questions would have led to discovery 
of Charlesworth's true condition had not Brunswick's 
agents kept him away from inquiring independently. 
Thus, these misrepresentations were kept alive and 
plaintiff continued to rely as defendant wished. Plain-
tiff acted reasonably and not negligently. 
POINT Ill. PLAIN11IFJ11 IS NOT BARRED 
BY ANY RELEASE E.LYECUTED IN THE 
CONESCO ACTION. 
Appellant doesn't seriously argue this point - it 
rather throws the point in as a suggestion for the Court 
to look into in the hope that something will come of it. 
For instance, three sections from the title Guaranty 
from 24 Am. J ur. are quoted at Pages 29 and 30 with-
out any argument tending to establish a guaranty rela-
tionship. In fact, Section 7 states that representations 
such as the plaintiff charges the defendant with in this 
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case "may not be relied on to establish contractual re-
lations" and that many such recommendations are made 
"without intending to become guarantors of the persons 
recommended." And then Section 87 refers to discharge 
of the principal debtor as releasing the guarantor, with-
out any attempt to show that Charlesworth is principal 
debtor and Brm1s,vick Corporation is guarantor. 
Then Appellant says the judgment in this case 
makes Brunswick a co-obligor of Charlesworth with 
no analysis of the relationship of the three parties and 
after Brunswick became a co-obligor (by the judg-
ment) there has been no release. 
And finally, Appellant quotes from Utah's Uni-
form Joint Obligation Act and doesn't even refer to 
the applicable definition. Section 15-4-1, after the few 
words quoted by Appellant at Page 30 of its Brief, 
states that " 'several obligors' means obligors severally 
bound for the same performance." 
Here, the performance Charlesworth owed to the 
plaintiff was a contractual one to construct and lease 
a building. The performance owed to the plaintiff by 
Brunswick Corporation was not to mislead him and 
the obligation found by the trial court to exist is one 
for tortious misrepresentation. The authorities we have 
examined refer to joint obligors or several obligors with 
reference to a contract or several contracts common 
to the parties; and joint obligors or co-obligors in the 
tort field refer to obligors both of whom have been 
engaged in related tortious conduct. We find no case, 
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except Appellant's argument, where it is suggested 
that where one party is bound by contract and the other 
has committed a tort, the fad that both are involved 
with one party claiming separate performances makes 
them several obligors or co-obligors. 
A group of cases having some analogous value are 
found in 40 A.L.R. 2d 1075 and llansen v. Collett, 
79 Nev. 159, 380 P. 2d 301 ( 1963). The question is: 
where a person suffers personal injury because of the 
negligence of another, and in treating those injuries 
a physician or some other person is guilty of negligence 
or malpractice, and the person causing the initial injury 
is released in writing, is the person involved in negligent 
treatment of those injuries also released? According 
to the annotation, the authorities are divided and Ne-
vada chooses to follow what it considers the minority 
but better-reasoned view, that there is no release of 
the second person unless that was intended by the re-
lease and the plaintiff was fully compensated for all 
injuries by the first release. Hansen v. Collett, supra, 
takes this holding, noting that the torts arc neither joint 
nor concurring: "They were distinct, separate and inde-
pendent. * * * Plaintiff settled with Hatch alone. * * * 
No double recovery would follow." If the release of 
a joint tort feasor is so circumscribed, then a fortiori 
the release of a person under contractual liability would 
have no effect to release the tort liability of a third 
party even though the tortious conduct and the contract 
were related to the same building. And Nevada reached 
this result even though its joint obligations statute 
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omits the reference to joint obligors being involved in 
"the same performance." Nevada Revised Statutes, 
Section 101.010. 
J1'rieders v. Krier, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N.,V. 77, 
31 A.L.R. ll8, is a case where a release was given and 
the action involved a contract an<l a tort. Frieders was 
injured while employed by his uncle. The uncle agreed 
to leave his money in his will if he would make no 
trouble because of the injury. Then Travelers Insur-
ance made \Vorkmen's Compensation payments and 
obtained a release of itself and the uncle. The uncle 
died intestate and Frieders sued the estate on his con-
tract. The court held the release from tort liability was 
not a release of the contract liability. 
See also Bank of Verona v. Stewart, 223, \Vis. 
577, ~70 N.YV. 534 at 536; 76 C.J.S., ReleMe, § 48, 
p. 678. 
CONCLUSION 
The :Memorandum Decision of the trial court ana-
lyzed the facts and the law applicable on defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case and 
denied the motion. This was not error. The evidence 
and the inferences therefrom support the ruling and 
the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
for Richards, Bird and Hart 
Attorneys at Law 
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